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The National Impact Test:
Applying Principled Commerce Clause
Analysis to Federal Environmental Regulation
DAVID M. METRES*
Current doctrine limits Congress's commerce power to regulation of "economic"
activities. Because many environmental laws regulate noneconomic objects, some have
argued that the Constitution does not grant Congress power to enact these
environmental laws.
This Note rejects analysis of whether an object of regulation is "economic," and
substitutes a test inspired by the principles underlying the Commerce Clause to
demarcate the proper spheres of federal and state regulatory authority. Under the
"national impact test," courts should evaluate whether federal legislation regulates
activities with a nationwide impact or which the states cannot regulate on their own. If
Congress does not make this showing, then the states should retain the power to
regulate.
Evaluating environmental legislation under this national impact test provides a more
coherent analytical framework-one that reflects the Framers' federalism principles,
conforms to the Constitution's structure, and restores political accountability. This
Note demonstrates that this analytical approach better carries out the purposes of the
Commerce Clause and provides a more coherent rationale for according Congress
constitutional authority to enact different modes of environmental regulation.
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The edifice of federal environmental legislation stands on shaky
constitutional ground. The United States v. Lopez' and United States v.
Morrison' decisions constrained Congress's power to legislate under the
Commerce Clause3 by requiring regulation of an economic activity. et,
environmental laws often regulate for noneconomic purposes. They seek
to protect public health,'6preserve the ecosystems that permit humans to
live and thrive on Earth, require consideration of federal actions on the
environment,7 and enable clean-up of polluted lands and waters.8 Of
course, environmental laws make commerce possible by ensuring clean
air, water, and land, preserving biodiversity, and preventing catastrophic
climate change, and they often regulate by attaching to economic
operations. But their basic justifications are often characterized in terms
of public health, aesthetics, and preservation-concepts one step
removed from economic activity.9
I. 514 U.S. 549 ('995).
2. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
3. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power. . . To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.
4. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607-19.
5. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2oo6 & Supp. 2o07); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (2oo6 & SUpp. 2008).
6. See Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2oo6 & Supp. 2oo8).
7. See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2oo6 & Supp. 2009).
8. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675; Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762.
9. Although this view is held by mainstream economists, there is a significant and growing body
of study called "ecological economics" that evaluates the interdependence of human economies and
natural ecosystems. Under this view, all human economic activity is merely a subset of natural
processes. See generally Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 675 (2003)-
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Current Commerce Clause doctrine enables Congress to regulate
"three broad categories of activity":
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the
power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.1o
However, because the substantial effects doctrine requires federal
legislation to regulate an "economic" activity, some argue that federal
environmental laws that have a "noneconomic" subject of regulation are
unconstitutional." Other commentators reject that view, arguing that
these environmental laws meet the Court's aggregation principle and
thus substantially affect interstate commerce," or that they may be
permitted under Gonzales v. Raich" as legitimate comprehensive
regulatory schemes. 4
Although the Supreme Court has not yet struck down any federal
environmental legislation under this rationale, the Court came close in
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (SWANCC)." In that case, the Court invalidated the Army
Corps' regulation, which applied to isolated wetlands frequented by
migratory birds, as beyond the Corps' statutory authority. 6 To do so, the
Court narrowly construed section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act" in
order not to raise constitutional concerns.'8 But the majority's haunting
dicta left continued federal environmental regulations with an uncertain
future. The Court implicated environmental management as a traditional
state category of legislation, calling land and water use management "the
States' traditional and primary power."" Even more troubling for
advocates of a federal power constitutionally capable of environmental
regulation, the Court questioned whether the Corps regulated "the
io. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (citations omitted).
i i. See generally, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands
Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. '74 (1998).
12. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich. Is the Endangered Species Act
Constitutional Under the Commerce Clause?, 78 U. COLo. L. REV. 375, 435-40 (2oo7).
13. 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
14. See, e.g., Mank, supra note 12, at 459-63.
15. 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001); see Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the
Constitution, 5o ARz. L. REV. 879, 912 (2oo8).
16. SWANCC, 53 U.S. at 174.
57. 33 U.S.C. 1344(a) (2006 & Supp. 2oo8).
x8. SWANCC, 535 U.S. at 170-74.
19. Id. at 174; see Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. I, 37 (2003).
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precise object or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce."2 This decisional approach, disconnected from
analysis of functional competence or the principles underlying the
Commerce Clause, but instead keyed to pure considerations of primary
economic effects, renders many environmental statutes particularly
vulnerable to attack as unconstitutional exercises of Congress's
commerce authority.
This Note, however, rejects analysis predicated on whether an
object of regulation is "economic" and substitutes an analysis of whether
the subject of regulation has a national impact. Under this "national
impact test," courts should evaluate whether federal legislation regulates
activities with a nationwide impact or which the states cannot regulate on
their own. If Congress does not make this showing, then the states, and
not Congress, should have the power to regulate. Evaluating
environmental legislation under this national impact test provides a more
coherent analytical framework-one that reflects the Framers'
federalism principles, conforms to the Constitution's structure, and
restores political accountability. This Note demonstrates that this
analytical approach better carries out the purposes of the Commerce
Clause, and provides a more coherent rationale for according Congress
constitutional authority to enact different modes of environmental
regulation.
While similar considerations plague federal regulatory schemes
addressing crime," civil rights," and social legislation,23 this Note will
focus on environmental regulation. In Part I, this Note will explore the
evolution and current state of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In Part
II, this Note will examine relevant criticisms of this jurisprudence, from
20. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added); see also Klein, supra note 19, at 38-39 ("The
Court's inclusion of the word 'object' may indicate an ongoing shift in its approach.... Federal
environmental laws might be rendered vulnerable to commerce clause challenges if the Court shifts its
focus from the nature of regulated activities (such as violence in the schools, violence against women,
or commercial landfill development) to the nature of protected objects (such as school children,
women, migratory birds, or wetlands). In other words, whereas activities proscribed on environmental
grounds are often commercial in nature, the objects of such environmental protection invariably have
little to do with economics or commerce. In fact, virtually any federal law with noncommercial social
or environmental goals could be invalidated under this logic." (footnote omitted)).
21. See generally Craig M. Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55 HASTINGs L.J.
573 (2004) (discussing Commerce Clause challenges to federal criminal law and concluding that much
of that body of law is constitutionally suspect).
22. See generally Louis J.Virelli III & David S. Leibovitz, "Federalism Whether They Want It or
Not": The New Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Civil Rights Legislation After United
States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926 (2ooi) (arguing that application of Morrison-informed
analysis may render civil rights legislation unconstitutional).
23. See generally Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over




textual, historical, structural, and institutional perspectives.24 Part III sets
forth the national impact test, which addresses the criticisms discussed in
Part II and offers a more principled method to determine the scope of
Congress's Commerce Clause power. In Part IV, I apply this national
impact test to environmental laws that suggest the propriety of federal
legislation. Part V considers situations where environmental legislation
under the test does not justify congressional action because the states can
individually remedy the problem on their own.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Case law from five interpretative eras reveals a continued, albeit
halting, shift away from a principled interpretation of Congress's
commerce power.
A. INITIAL ENCOUNTERS
In the 1824 case Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court first
interpreted the scope of the federal commerce power.25 Chief Justice
John Marshall, writing for the Court, applied the dormant or negative
aspect of the Commerce Clause and held that a state law regulating
steamboat licensing was an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce
Clause.
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its
action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to
those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to
those which are completely within a particular State, which do not
affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for
the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
government.2 7
Indeed, the Court recognized that the commerce power should not
allow Congress to regulate States' completely internal issues.
Comprehensive as the word "among" is, it may very properly be
restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. The
phrase is not ... an apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration
of the particular classes of commerce, to which the power was to be
extended, would not have made, had the intention been to extend the
power to every description. The enumeration presupposes something
not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the
24. The criticisms of this jurisprudence are legion, but this Note limits its analysis to only the most
relevant issues.
25. 22 U.S. (9 wheat.) I(1824).
26. Id. at 2 15-22.
27. Id. at 195.
28. Id. at '94.
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subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a
State."
Scholars and judges across the ideological spectrum recognize that the
sparse debate at the Founding Convention regarding the extent of the
enumerated commerce power yields no conclusive authority as to its
precise meaning.30 As a result, the Gibbons Court's exploration of the
commerce power is largely regarded as authoritative.3'
Even so, in this case of first impression, the Court "described the
Federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded."32 The
Gibbons Court did not employ formalist, dictionary definitions of
"commerce" to limit its meaning, but recognized that "[c]ommerce,
undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse." 3 This
expansive and expanding conception of the power reflects an early
awareness that the Constitution must encounter practical, current
realities and its power must shift within its structural constraints
accordingly.34
This Note largely adopts the Gibbons rationale that regulation of
exclusively internal state affairs should remain with the states, but then
clarifies that objects or activities with a national impact or those which
the states are separately incompetent to regulate should be within
Congress's regulatory authority." By considering both the impact on the
nation's unity and the states' capacity to cure the problem independently,
the Court adhered to the principles underlying my national impact test.
Similarly, in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the Court focused on
which sovereign should regulate.36 However, this time the Court upheld
the state pilotage laws at issue, reasoning that national uniform
legislation was not required.37
Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit
only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to
be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by
29. Id. at 194-95.
30. See, e.g., David G. Wille, The Commerce Clause: A Time for Reevaluation, 70 TUL. L. REV.
io69, 1o73 (1996) (citing Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L.
REV. 1387, 1389 (1987); Robert L. Stem, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One, 47
HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1346-47 (1934)).
31. See id.
32. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. II I, 120 (1942).
33. 22 U.S. at 189.
34. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. i, 9 (1877) ("The powers thus granted [to
Congress] are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce. . . known or in use when the
Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves
to the new developments of time and circumstances.")). Contra United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S 549,
585-89 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for limiting the commerce power to "commerce" as
defined in circa-1789 dictionaries).
35. See generally Stern, supra note 30.
36. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (i85i)-
37. Id. at 321.
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Congress.... [But] [t]he act of 1789 contains a clear and authoritative
declaration by the first Congress, that the nature of this subject is such,
that until Congress should find it necessar to exert its power, it should
be left to the legislation of the States ....
Although this limited formulation of the commerce power was
subsequently rejected,3 9 the Court's rationale provides an early example
of the Court grappling with the question of which sovereign is the proper
regulating authority. There was no question of whether a pilotage law
was a "commercial" activity; instead, the Court analyzed whether state
regulation would excessively interfere with national purposes and
requirements.40 The national impact test adopts a similar interpretative
approach, according power to the federal government on national issues.
B. FIRST FORMALISMS
Throughout the first century of the Republic, the Court invoked the
Commerce Clause rarely and usually to "negative" state laws that
interfered with interstate commerce.4' This was because "[i]t was not
until 1887 . . . that the interstate commerce power began to exert positive
influence in American law and life."' With rapid industrialization, the
railroad boom, and the growth of a national economy, Congress invoked
a broader commerce power.43 As Congress increasingly deployed its
commerce authority to reach even intrastate activities, courts began
developing tests to demarcate the extent of Congress's regulatory
authority under the Commerce Clause. Those early tests prioritized
formalist, narrow conceptions of what is "commerce," rather than
considering which sovereign had the capacity to regulate.
During this era of formalism, the Supreme Court "created
categorical enclaves beyond congressional reach by declaring such
activities as 'mining,' 'production,' 'manufacturing,' and union
membership to be outside the definition of 'commerce' and by limiting
application of the effects test to 'direct' rather than 'indirect' commercial
38. Id. at 319.
39. See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.. 550 U.S. 330, 350-
51 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) ("[The Court's] modem jurisprudence focuses upon
the way in which States regulate those subjects to decide whether the regulation is permissible.").
40. See Conley, 53 U.S. at 319-21.
41. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553-54 (995) (citing Veazie v. Moor. 55 U.S. (14
How.) 568, 573-75 (1853); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. I, 17, 20-22 (1888)), see also Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) i, 215-22 (1824); infra Part II.B.
42. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III, 121-22 (1942) (footnote omitted) (detailing the early
debates over the extent of Congress's affirmative commerce power following the enactment of the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Act of 1890).
43. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379, 379-87 (current version at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1o1ol-1ol64 (2006 & Supp. 2008)); Sherman Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209, 2o9-lo (current version at i5
U.S.C. §§ 1-38 (2oo6 & Supp. 2009)).
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consequences."" Through these cases, the Court established the practice
of determining the extent of Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause by keying analysis to static and formalist definitions of
''commerce,' rather than determining Congress's power in light of the
comparative competence principles underlying the larger Constitutional
scheme.45
C. MODERN EFFECTS ANALYSIS
Following President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's threatened court-
packing plan amidst the Great Depression, as well as a change in the
Court's composition, the Court began to reject its formalist distinctions
in J93746 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., the Court ruled that
Congress's commerce power included authority to regulate union
legislation and collective bargaining agreements because these activities
affected interstate commerce.4 7 In so doing, the Court recognized that the
scope of the commerce power
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between
what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government.48
This admonition was briefly considered and invoked as a rhetorical tool
by both the Lopez49 and Morrison"o Courts, but those decisions were
justified on narrow distinctions of what is "economic," not on the larger
federalism issue of which sovereign has the capacity to regulate.
In United States v. Darby, the Court rejected formalist arguments
that the maximum wage and minimum hour regulations under the Fair
Labor Standards Act exceeded Congress's commerce authority even as
Congress sought to regulate intrastate, noncommercial activities.'
However, the Court there focused its analysis on whether the regulation
44. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 642 (2ooo) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. I (1895); In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 505-o6 (1905); The Employers'
Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 495-96 (1908); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 ('908); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 545-
548 (1935); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 368-69 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936)).
45. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs 249-54 (3d ed.
2006).
46. Justice Willis Van Devanter, who consistently ruled against broad federal power, retired June
2, 1937.
47.- 301 U.S. 1, 37-41 (19'7).
48. Id. at 37.
49. See 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. at 37).
50. See 529 U.S. 598, 6o8 (2000) (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 30l U.S. at 37).
51. 312 U.S. 10o, 123 (x941).
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truly concerned commercial activities." Indeed, the only consideration of
the federalist principles that cabin the Clause was the Court's dismissive
statement that the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered."" Instead, Darby applied the
means-ends analysis of McCulloch v. Maryland,54 interpreting the
Necessary and Proper Clause as allowing Congress to regulate intrastate
activities that significantly affect interstate commerce." The Court, then,
did not examine the federalism implications and the proper spheres of
federal and state authority. Rather, the Darby Court merely justified the
statute's validity instead of legitimizing it in terms of the larger
Constitutional structure. Justice Antonin Scalia, sixty-five years later,
adopted a similar rationale when he relied on the Necessary and Proper
Clause to sustain the Controlled Substances Act in Raich in his
influential concurring opinion."
In 1942, the Court developed another rationale to define
"commerce." In Wickard v. Filburn, the Court held that farmer Roscoe
Filburn's homegrown wheat for personal consumption could be
regulated under the Commerce Clause." Even though Filburn's wheat
was consumed in his home and thus did not enter interstate commerce,
the Court reasoned that the aggregation of activities like Filbum's would
result in a substantial effect on interstate commerce." The Court noted
that
a review of the course of decision under the Commerce Clause will
make plain, however, that questions of the power of Congress are not
to be decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling
force to nomenclature such as "production" and "indirect" and
foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in question
upon interstate commerce.59
While this analysis displays much more awareness of the practical
implications of the regulations at issue, the decision relied on the
52. Id. at 113-25.
53. Id. at 124.
54. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
55. Darby, 312 U.S. at I18 ("The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to
the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect
interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.").
56. See 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Congress's regulatory
authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper
Clause."); infra Part I.E.
57. 317 U.S. II I, 1 29 (1942).-
58. Id. at 128.
59. Id. at I120.
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expansive idea of aggregating activities affecting commerce. The Court
avoided evaluating which sovereign should have the power to regulate
the activity at issue.
Nonetheless, the Wickard Court did make an early foray into
conducting a strain of a national impact analysis when it considered the
wheat industry from global, national, and regional perspectives.6 What
the Court left out of its analysis, however, was consideration of whether
the states would be separately incompetent to handle the problem of
production for home use of wheat. Had they conducted such analysis, the
Court likely would have found that the states could not curtail this
activity, because the wheat market's global scope would defeat piecemeal
state efforts to control production.6 Still, once the Wickard Court
recognized the necessity of national regulation, the Court easily rejected
the idea that the judiciary should be able to interpose its views of
economic fairness in place of Congress's considered judgment.63
D. RETURN TO FORMALISM
From 1937 until 1995, the Supreme Court did not strike down any
congressional legislation as beyond the federal commerce power.64 In
1995, however, the Court in United States v. Lopez struck down the Gun
Free School Zones Act as a noneconomic regulation beyond Congress's
commerce power. 65 The Lopez Court rejected the argument that the Act
regulated anything "to do with 'commerce' or an economic enterprise."66
Whether one agrees with that analysis or not, the Court failed to engage
the question of whether the states were separately incompetent to deal
with the issue at hand or whether the national impact was such that a
national response was required. Rather, the Court simply complained
that "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in
areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States
historically have been sovereign."" Despite the clear evidence that
6o. See id. at 127-28 ("That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial
by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.").
61. Id. at 125-28.
62. See id. at 126 ("In the absence of regulation, the price of wheat in the United States would be
much affected by world conditions.").
63. Id. at 129 ("It is of the essence of regulation that it lays a restraining hand on the self-interest
of the regulated and that advantages from the regulation commonly fall to others. The conflicts of
economic interest between the regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely left under our
system to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and responsible legislative process.").
64. Cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 637 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the stability of the Commerce Clause suggests that the Court should be loath to strike down federal
legislation as beyond Congress's constitutional power).
65- 514 U.S. 549' 566--68 (1995)-
66. Id. at 56I.
67. Id. at 564.
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Congress had long exercised power over both criminal law enforcement
and education, 68 the Lopez majority correctly observedt that the
principal dissent's "costs of crime" approach yielded no clear limiting
principle.o Nevertheless, the means employed (the
"economic/noneconomic" distinction) to differentiate what is local or
national does not clarify why a regulation of economic activity should
come within the ambit of congressional power. Thus, both the Lopez
majority and Justice Breyer's dissent failed to effectively engage the
underlying principle that should drive Commerce Clause adjudication-
whether the states are separately competent to regulate the activity at
issue.
Following Lopez, Congress focused its findings on the economic
impact of proposed legislation, not whether an issue is truly national in
scope or whether states are separately incompetent. However, five years
later in Morrison, the Court struck down the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA)," despite explicit congressional findings that the statute
regulated activity that substantially affected interstate commerce." The
Court reasoned that acts of violence against women had only an indirect
effect on economic activities and therefore were beyond Congress's
commerce power." The dissenting Justices criticized the majority for
"breath[ing] new life into the approach of categorical limitation."'
Pointing out the absurdity of the new formalist approach of examining
whether a regulated activity is "economic," the dissent wondered,
"[d]oes the local street corner mugger engage in 'economic' or
'noneconomic' activity when he mugs for money?""
In one of the opinions filed for the dissent, Justice Breyer pointed
out that "[we] live in a Nation knit together by two centuries of scientific,
technological, commercial, and environmental change. Those changes,
taken together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no matter how
local, genuinely can affect commerce, or its conditions, outside the
State-at least when considered in the aggregate."" Although Justice
Breyer sought to preserve the aggregation principle in Morrison, his
68. See, e.g., Rory K. Little & Teresa Chen, The Lost History of Apprendi and the Blakely
Petition for Rehearing, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 69, 69 (2004) (discussing the first federal crime bill, Act of
Apr. 30, 1790, Ch. 9, i Stat. 112, 112-19).
69. See 514 U.S. at 564-66.
70. See id. at 615-44 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71. Pub. L. No. 103-322, lo8 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 16, 18, & 42
U.S.C.).
72. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-29 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing the
"mountain of data" that Congress assembled to legitimize the legislation as a clear difference between
the VAWA and the congressional legislation at issue in Lopez).
73. See id. at 607-19 (majority opinion).
74. Id. at 640 (Souter, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 66o.
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comment makes clear that aggregation, by itself, cannot provide a
meaningful method for distinguishing what the Constitution permits
Congress to regulate.
E. COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATIVE SCHEMES
In its last major encounter with the extent of congressional
regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause, the Court in Gonzales
v. Raich upheld application of the Controlled Substances Act to
intrastate, noncommercial home production of marijuana for medicinal
use." That decision relied on the logic of Wickard by reasoning that the
aggregation of noneconomic activities (persons growing marijuana at
home for personal, medicinal use) would undermine regulation of
"quintessentially economic" activities.' 8 The Court applied the well-
established principle that "[w]here the class of activities is regulated and
that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power
'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class." 79
However, the aggregation principle does not, by its terms, address
whether the states are separately incompetent and thus the federal
government should act.t Nor does the principle have any meaningful
stopping point where aggregation would not justify federal regulation.8
But, even with the aggregation principle intact, some federal
environmental legislation may be unconstitutional -particularly where
there is no "economic" activity to aggregate. 82 Nonetheless, the
aggregation principle provides a blunt instrument courts can wield that
might demonstrate a national impact.
In a concurring opinion in Raich, Justice Scalia presented a
compelling argument that would likely justify many federal
environmental regulations, even though he criticized the substantial
77. 545 U.S.1, 32-33 (2005).
78. Id. at 16-20 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III (1942)).
79. Id. at 23 (alteration in original) (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)); see
also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,308 (1980).
8o. But, aggregation can be a useful tool in determining the overall national impact of a regulated
activity.
81. See supra Part I.D. Justice Thomas has also argued that the aggregation principle bears the
further flaw that it renders other constitutional provisions meaningless. See United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 589 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). This Note does not adhere to that argument.
82. See generally Nagle, supra note ii (arguing that Wickard should not be read to justify
aggregation of endangered species because that case only legitimized aggregation of a single
commodity, not different objects with different or nonexistent values in commerce; as a result, the
ESA's application to intrastate, noncommercial species is unconstitutional). But see Mank, supra note
I2, at 435-55 (favoring the Raich Court's logic that where Congress's legislation is a comprehensive
economic regulation, instances of noneconomic, intrastate activities shall not be "excise[d] as trivial,"
and arguing that the ESA's protection of noneconomic, intrastate species should be upheld (quoting
54 U.S. at 22)).
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effects test.83 Justice Scalia relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause to
justify application of the federal commerce iower to Angel Raich's
admittedly noneconomic, intrastate activity. Yet, Justice Scalia's
argument also supports limiting the reach of the Commerce Clause to
noncommercial activities where comprehensive legislation would not be
undercut." This invocation of the Necessary and Proper Clause suggests
the propriety of an elastic commerce inquiry, attuned to the principle
that Congress should be able to regulate subjects of commerce with a
national impact or where the states are separately incompetent to act.
F. THE COURT'S PROBLEMATIc LEGACY
The Commerce Clause lurks innocuously deep in the Constitution,
one of Congress's eighteen enumerated powers." Nevertheless, the
Clause has become a "cloaked dynamo" that Congress has invoked to
regulate race discrimination, intrastate crime, air and water pollution,
endangered species, securities, and other social evils, in addition to more
patently commercial activities."' To achieve this result, "[t]he Court has
abstracted a general principle from the list in Section 8, translated the
eighteenth-century inventory to the present, and given Congress the
power to regulate any subject that the states cannot regulate
effectively."8 However, the Court has not expressly acknowledged this
approach; instead it has simply invoked the notoriously malleable phrase
"substantial effects on interstate commerce" and required regulation of
an "economic" activity.89
Even more problematic, the Court cannot rationally deny Congress
power even if states can manage the issue on their own, so long as the
regulation is substantially related to economic effects.' For example,
Justice Breyer's dissent in Lopez focused on the cumulative economic
"costs of crime." 9' While these costs do have a national impact, Justice
Breyer failed to consider whether the states could independently achieve
the purposes sought by Congress. Under this aggregative approach of
83. See 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Congress's regulatory authority
over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including activities that
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause."): see
also Mank, supra note 12, at 415-22,435-59.
84. See 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
85. Id.
86. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8.
87. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Third Translation of the Commerce Clause: Congressional
Power to Regulate Social Problems, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 12o6, 1209 (1998).
88. Id. at 1213. This observation reflects one aspect of the national impact test.
89. See id.
90. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599-600 (i995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he
substantial effects test suffers from the further flaw that it appears to grant Congress a police power
over the Nation.").
91. See id. at 615-44 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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noneconomic actions, there is no principled justification for refusing
Congress the power to regulate.92 In the resulting incoherence,
"[i]nterstate commerce now includes within its meaning its antonym:
matter which is actually local and capable of being regulated and
governed by exercise of local power,"93 so long as the matter is
encompassed within a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme.94
Finally, a formalist reading of the Commerce Clause reduces the
federal government to acting legitimately only if it relates social,
environmental, criminal, and civil rights legislation to commerce.95 As a
result, ordinary citizens cannot determine which sovereign should be
acting and the lines of political responsibility become blurred and
illusory.0
We have not lost that ability [to distinguish which sovereign should
legislate in a given area] just because the Constitution's text has aged
and we no longer comprehend eighteenth century culture; we have lost
that power, in part, because twentieth-century courts have engaged in
interpretive fictions that do not make sense. I could explain to my ten-
year-old son that the Constitution permits Congress to prohibit racial
discrimination because racism anywhere in the country undermines the
dignity of all citizens. But my son would think I was joking if I
suggested that the Constitution allows Congress to prohibit race
discrimination because those acts occur in settings in which people
purchase goods from other states. Yet the latter explanation is exactly
what the Supreme Court would have him believe."
92. See id. at 564-66 (majority opinion); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. I, 57-58 (2005)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Respondents . . .use marijuana that has never been bought or sold, that has
never crossed state lines, and that has had no demonstrable effect on the national market for
marijuana. If Congress can regulate this under the Commerce Clause, then it can regulate virtually
anything-and the Federal Government is no longer one of limited and enumerated powers."); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612-13 (2000); Merritt, supra note 87, at 1214.
93. Vanue B. Lacour, The Misunderstanding and Misuse of the Commerce Clause, 30S.U. L.
REV. 187, 189 (2003).
94. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 33-42 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
95. Merritt, supra note 87, at 1213-16.
96. Cf Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The theory that two governments
accord more liberty than one requires for its realization two distinct and discernable lines of political
accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal Government; the second between the citizens
and the States.... Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of
traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility
would become illusory."); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992) (finding
that where Congress commandeered New York's legislature to force the state to take title to
radioactive waste, accountability of both federal and state officials to their constituents is diminished).
97. Merritt, supra note 87, at 1216; see also id. at 1215 n.31 ("Ollie's Barbeque 'annually
receiv[ed] about $70,000 worth of food which has moved in commerce,' and ... Congress
'determined. . .that refusals of service to Negroes have imposed burdens both upon the interstate
flow of food and upon the movement of products generally.'" (first and third alterations in original)
(quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298, 303 (1964))); id. at 1215 n.32 ("[T]he right of
people to be free of state action that discriminates against them because of race .. . 'occupies a more
protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal
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All of these problems have resulted in a jurisprudence unmoored
from the foundational principles and purposes of the Constitution.
II. CURRENT COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE DOES NOT COMPORT
WITH THE TEXT, PRINCIPLES, AND PURPOSES OF THE CONSTITUTION
The criticisms of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence are
legion. This Part, however, will not catalogue those grievances. Instead,
this Part begins with the proposition that constitutional adjudications
should be guided by constitutional principles, not by the exclusive
textualism more properly the province of statutory interpretation. Chief
Justice Marshall's interpretative touchstone that "it is a constitution we
are expounding" requires a principled interpretative approach. To fulfill
this prerogative, the judiciary should be hesitant to attribute a fixed and
limited meaning to the Constitution's terms, lest it take on "the prolixity
of a legal code." 99 Even in the relatively formalist Lopez decision, Justice
Kennedy recognized the necessity of considering the broader structure of
the Constitution to interpret its meaning. "[W]hatever terminology is
used, the criterion is necessarily one of degree and must be so defined.
This does not satisfy those who seek mathematical or rigid formulas. But
such formulas are not provided by the great concepts of the
Constitution."" This Note employs analysis guided by those very
concepts.
A. THE TEXT OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE YIELDS No CLEAR CONCLUSION
Of course, any analysis of a constitutional power must begin with
the text. The Commerce Clause states, "The Congress shall have
Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.. .a.,o' As one of a list of
across state lines."' (alterations in original) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 279 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring))); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 165
(Anchor 1966) (1835) ("1 have hardly ever met one of the common people in America who did not
surprisingly and easily perceive which obligations derived from a law of Congress and which were
based on the laws of his state and who, having distinguished the matters falling within the general
prerogatives of the Union from those suitable to the local legislature, could not indicate the point
where the competence of the federal courts commences and that of the state courts ends."), quoted in
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 125. 125).
98. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
99. Id.; see CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 197 (1966); see also Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 830-31 n.5 (2oo6) (Justice Scalia writing for the Court: "Restricting the Confrontation
Clause to the precise forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its extinction.");
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (200) (Justice Scalia writing for the Court and noting that
the "advance of technology" has necessarily changed the meaning of "search and seizure").
1oo. 514 U.S. at 573 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III, 123 n.24
(1942)).
10o. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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enumerated powers that grant Congress power to legislate, the noscitur a
sociis canon of interpretation applies. Applying that canon suggests that
the Commerce Clause's scope should be interpreted to grant powers of
similar scope as those granted in the same section. All the other
enumerated powers grant Congress power to legislate on issues that the
states could not effectively regulate on their own or which required a
unified national voice." This analysis suggests that Congress must have
power to regulate activities with a national impact or where the states are
separately incompetent. No court has adopted this position and, as noted
above, the closest to an authoritative statement on the Commerce
Clause's meaning comes from Gibbons v. Ogden." As such, this Note
does not undertake an exhaustive textual exegesis; it instead argues that
one must consult the principles underlying the larger constitutional
structure to determine the meaning of its terms.0 4
B. THE FRAMERS SOUGHT TO GRANT CONGRESS POWER TO REGULATE
ACTIVITIES WITH A NATIONAL IMPACT OR WHERE THE STATES ARE
SEPARATELY INCOMPETENT
Contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence does not accurately
reflect the principles and purposes extant in 1787 at the Constitutional
Convention. By consulting the underlying principles motivating the
Framers' adoption of the Clause, the Clause's import in our
constitutional scheme will be clarified.
According to Justice Thomas, "our case law has drifted far from the
original understanding of the Commerce Clause."'05 However, Justice
Thomas has sought to narrowly define "commerce," binding the extent
of Congress's regulatory power to the definition found in 1791
dictionaries.oS This interpretative approach ignores federalism principles
and constitutional structure. Heeding Justice Thomas's call for a
reconsideration of the Commerce Clause, Professor Douglas Kmiec
suggests that the Court should turn its analysis away from "vague
102. See id. § 8 (granting power to borrow money on behalf of the United States, pass
naturalization laws, declare wars, coin money, raise and support an army and navy, set up a judiciary,
etc.).
io3. See supra Part I.A.
104. As this Note reached its final stages of publication, Professor Jack Balkin posted a draft
manuscript of an exhaustive examination of the meaning of "commerce." Professor Balkin's analysis
of the original meanings of the term "commerce" comports with the findings and position of this Note:
namely, that Congress must be empowered to regulate where there is a national impact or the states
are separately incompetent. See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law Working Paper
No. 2o6, 20oo), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1553o2.
ro5. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the substantial effects test as a "rootless and
malleable standard"). This Note seeks to expose and focus on the root of the standard.
io6. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585-87 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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terminology like 'economic activity' and substantively define
commerce."" Yet even Professor Kmiec recognizes that "[t]he
[commercial] definition should also reflect a principled understanding of
the purpose of the original enumeration of the commerce power in
Article I: namely, Madison's proposition that the national government
was to have 'compleat authority in all cases which require uniformity.'"
i. The Philadelphia Convention
The choices the Framers made at the Constitutional Convention
among competing grants of power should be instructive in our
understanding of the Commerce Clause. The Framers expressed
preference for the Virginia Plan, which contained a broader grant of
federal regulatory power than the rejected New Jersey Plan." The Sixth
of the Virginia Resolutions, proposed by Governor Edmund Randolph
of Virginia, set forth a "broad standard. . . for the division of power
between state and nation [that] was criticized by some of the delegates as
being too indefinite, but was approved by the Convention on May 31st
by a vote of nine states in favor, none against, one divided.""" That
standard mandated
that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the
Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation &
moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation."'
This nearly unanimous vote reflects an emphatic embrace of the
national impact principle, even more striking because there was
significant opposition and suggestions for delay on such a vote until an
"exact enumeration" could be drafted.II2
io7. Douglas W. Kmiec, Rediscovering a Principled Commerce Power, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 547. 560
(2001); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
xo8. Kmiec, supra note 107, at 56o (quoting THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 345 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1904)).
1o9. See generally Stern, supra note 30, at 1339. Of course, significant disagreement exists over
whether this preference bears any weight in granting that choice any relevance in adjudicating
Commerce Clause cases. Compare, e.g., id. at 1366 ("The Court can avoid the possibility of placing the
nation in a defenseless position by returning to the original conception of the commerce clause-by
allowing federal control of those business transactions which occur in and concern more states than
one and which the individual states are separately incompetent to control."), with Wile, supra note 30,
at 1079 ("[Stern's] argument is pure speculation. There is no evidence to suggest that the Framers
thought that the enumerated powers incorporated into the Constitution were as broad as the power
contemplated in the resolution sent to the Committee of Detail.").
ilo. Stern, supra note 30, at 1338.
III. JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1836), reprinted in CHARLES
C. TANSILL, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF AMERICAN STATES 117
(1927), quoted in Stern, supra note 30, at 1338.
1 12. John C. Hueston, Note, Altering the Course of the Constitutional Convention: The Role of the
Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State and Federal Powers, 100 YALE L.J. 765, 767
(1990) (quoting ITHE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 53-54 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
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A much closer vote followed the proposal made by Gunning
Bedford of Delaware for an even broader grant of congressional power:
"[T]o legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also
in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the
harmony of the U. States may be interrupted by the exercise of
individual Legislation."" Six states voted in favor and four against this
broad grant of a police power."4 The only salient difference between the
two proposals was the inclusion of the power to legislate in the general
welfare. Therefore, the proposal granting Congress power to legislate
where the states are separately incompetent or where there is a national
impact had nearly unanimous support of the founding delegates.
However, the delegates were closely split on granting Congress a police
power. These votes must be considered to reach a coherent
understanding of the intended reach of enumerated powers, including
the Commerce Clause.
Now two months into their deliberations, the Convention
recognized that time was running short on the long, hot summer of
creating a new republic. They knew the Constitution had to be drafted
and approved, and in a hurry."' The Framers appointed a Committee of
Detail to "prepare & retort a Constitution conformable" to the
Convention's proceedings." Made up of five delegates, the Committee
of Detail produced the first draft of the Constitution."7
To the contemporary citizen, it may seem stunning that five persons
were given the task of formulating the language that would govern our
nation 200 years hence. The Convention seemed to agree, by clarifying
the minor and nontransformative role envisioned for the Committee by
consistently referring to them as a Committee of Detail."' By using the
limited descriptor "detail," the delegates appeared to consider the
Committee's role to be quite limited."
However, "rather than simply elaborating upon the existing
resolutions, the Committee actually redefined the constitutional balance
of state and federal powers by enhancing the rights of the states at the
expense of sweeping central powers."o"' The enumeration of the
Univ. Press 1966) (1911) [hereinafter RECORDS]).
113. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 2 REcoRDs, supra note i12, at 26).
114. Id. (quoting 2 RECORDS, supra note I12, at 27).
115. BOWEN, supra note 99, at 192-93.
116. Hueston, supra note 112, at 768-69 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 2 REcORDs, supra note 112,
at 95).
I17. See id. at 769-74. Those delegates were: Edmund Randolph of Virginia, James Wilson of
Pennsylvania, John Rutledge of South Carolina, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, and Oliver
Ellsworth of Connecticut. Id. at 774.
i8. See id. at 769-74-
119. Id. at 769.
120. Id. at 766.
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legislative powers that emerged from the Committee greatly reduced the
scope of federal powers approved by the vote on the Sixth Virginia
Resolution. The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy
Clause, perhaps, may have restored some of the power lost by the
government in the detailing,"' but the Committee dropped language
referring to Congress's discretion to "determine the areas in which the
states are separately incompetent."'22
As the Convention hurtled toward fall and the imminent departure
of the delegates, pressure to bring the Convention to a successful
conclusion with a fully formed Constitution resulted in "[r]ushed
deliberations [that] forced clashing delegates to find middle ground."' 3
When the enumeration of powers came before the full Convention, the
Convention approved it unanimously and without comment. 4
This absence of objection to or comment upon the change is
susceptible of only one explanation-that the Convention believed that
the enumeration conformed to the standard previously approved, and
that the powers enumerated comprehended those matters as to which
the states were separately incompetent and in which national
legislation was essential. If the Convention had thought that the
committee's enumeration was a departure from the general standard
for the division of powers to which it had thrice agreed, there can be
little doubt that the subject would have been thoroughly debated on
the Convention floor. 25
Indeed, there would have been little reason for this to be a concern
because use of the phrase "general welfare" in the Preamble and
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution "demonstrate[s] that the
Convention thought that the Constitution would serve and should be
construed 'to promote the general welfare' and not to perpetuate a union
of states powerless when power is needed most.""' In these
121. Id. at 771.
122. Id. at 770.
123. Id. at 780.
124. Stern, supra note 30, at 1340.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1342; see also I JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTIU=TION OF THE UNTED
STATES § 459 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1873) ("The importance of examining the preamble,
for the purpose of expounding the language of a statute, has been long felt, and universally conceded
in all juridical discussions... . Its true office is to expound the nature and extent and application of the
powers actually conferred by the Constitution, and not substantively to create them. For example, the
preamble declares one object to be, 'to provide for the common defence.' No one can doubt that this
does not enlarge the powers of Congress to pass any measures which they may deem useful for the
common defence. But suppose the terms of a given power admit of two constructions, the one more
restrictive, the other more liberal, and each of them is consistent with the words, but is, and ought to
be governed by the intent of the power; if one would promote and the other defeat the common
defence, ought not the former, upon the soundest principles of interpretation, to be adopted? Are we
at liberty, upon any principles of reason or common-sense to adopt a restrictive meaning which will
defeat an avowed object of the Constitution, when another equally natural and more appropriate to
the object is before us? Would this not be to destroy an instrument by a measure of its words, which
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circumstances, where the Framers had nearly unanimously approved the
Sixth Virginia Resolution, and the Constitution admonished interpreters
to promote the general welfare, there was no need for the Framers to be
hypertechnical about whether the enumerated list completely
encapsulated the principle.
The history of the Committee of Detail's reduction of federal
powers and the hurried conclusion to the Constitution's drafting suggest
that the words "Commerce. . . among the several States" do not
precisely embody the Framers' intentions. Of course, that was the
language that every State endorsed, so we should not read out the words
entirely. Rather, the principles driving the embodied language should be
more carefully consulted. To do otherwise would relegate Congress to
regulating only those articles which could be said to be "moving in
commerce," as the phrase was known in 1789. Whatever the simplistic
appeal of this approach, adopting this stance would cripple our modern
government's ability to regulate, as well as belie what the Framers sought
to create-a federal government that could respond where national
interests are at stake or where the States are "separately incompetent."....
2. Daniel Webster's Winning Argument in Gibbons
In his role as victorious counsel for the petitioner in Gibbons v.
Ogden, the first case touching on the scope of the commerce power,
Daniel Webster presented an eloquent argument that drew directly on
this history in arguing for an expansive commerce power.128 Webster's
argument did not address at length whether the state pilotage law at issue
actually was commerce. In fact, Webster rejected the attempt to define
commerce, because, he argued, constitutions should not be interpreted in
this way.' Rather, Webster recognized the limitation of narrowly
defining words in a guiding governmental document:
In conferring powers, [the Constitution] proceeded in the way of
enumeration, stating the powers conferred, one after another, in few
words; and, where the power was general, or complex in its nature, the
extent of the grant must necessarily be judged of, and limited, by its
object, and by the nature of its power.'
Thus, Webster argued (and the Court adopted his position3') that the
underlying principle of the grant of power must be considered when
interpreting that power's scope and interpretation.
that instrument itself repudiates?"), quoted in Stern, supra note 30, at 1342-43-
127. See JAMES MADISON ET AL., THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 265 (photo. reprint 1999) (1787).
128. 22 U.S. (9 wheat.) I, 3-33 (1824).
129. See id. at 9-10.
130. Id. at io-xI (emphasis omitted).
131. Id. at 221.
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Indeed, Webster could not argue that regulation of navigation was a
regulation of commerce, because navigation was not traditionally defined
as commerce." 2 Instead, Webster argued that the New York pilotage law
granting a monopoly would undermine national commercial harmony.'3
In so arguing, Webster employed analysis most closely related to
contemporary dormant commerce clause doctrine.'" That analysis
reflects a cogent awareness that issues with a national impact, not just
activities that could be defined exclusively as "commerce" in 1791,
should be within Congress's purview under the Commerce Clause.
Indeed, the recognition that the "national economy and the national
legislative power expand in tandem is not a recent discovery," but was
first noted by the Court in 1878.3' As noted in Part I.A, the Court in
Gibbons agreed with Webster's rationale and struck down the State law.
Therefore, in keeping with the views of the Framers of the
Constitution and the winning arguments of Webster in the first
Commerce Clause case, analysis should not focus exclusively on defining
or delimiting "commerce." Instead, Commerce Clause cases should
recognize the principles underlying the Clause's adoption and enable
legislation pursuant to the commerce power where there is a national
impact or the states are separately incompetent to effectively regulate
the issue at hand.
C. FEDERALISM CONCERNS ARE NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED BY
SOLICITUDE FOR TRADITIONAL STATE GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS
The enumeration of powers is predicated on the idea that states
should have general legislative authority and the federal government
should be limited to acting where the states cannot address an issue
separately." 6 But "[t]he Framers feared that the States, if left to their
own devices, would interfere with interstate commerce and create
132. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-87 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (employing
circa-1789 dictionaries to determine the meaning of "commerce").
133. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 14 ("Henceforth, the commerce of the States was to be an unit; and the
system by which it was to exist and be governed, must necessarily be complete, entire, and uniform. Its
character was to be described in the flag which waved over it, E PLURIBUS UNUM.").
134. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) ("Imposts and duties upon
interstate commerce are placed beyond the power of a state, without the mention of an exception, by
the provision committing commerce of that order to the power of the Congress."); see also Lopez. 514
U.S. at 579-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 647 n.15 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1878)).
136. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543. 544-45 (954)
("National action has thus always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an intrusion to be
justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case. .. . Even when Congress acts, its
tendency has been to frame enactments on an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives,
supplanting state-created norms only so far as may be necessary for the purpose.").
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disagreements between themselves. They foresaw the need for national
control to prevent animosity between the several States."'37 Out of these
competing considerations, the Commerce Clause sought to demarcate
the proper boundaries of federal and, through its negative implications,
state authority. Indeed, "[t]his clause has throughout the Court's history
been the chief source of its adjudications regarding federalism."3' Yet
despite the Commerce Clause's centrality in demarcating the proper
spheres of sovereign authority, the Court rarely examines which
sovereign would be best suited to regulating.
One way to evaluate which sovereign should regulate is to examine
traditional state government roles and reserve those areas of regulation
to the states.'" However, relying on historical definitions of traditional
state governmental functions as setting the outer bounds of Congress's
commerce power creates an impossible judicial task. 40 First, where a new
problem emerges that is not traditionally within the ken of state
authority, there is no meaningful way to deny the federal government
power to regulate, even if the states could easily do so by themselves. 4'
Second, where a regulation is within the states' traditional powers but the
states do not have the capacity to regulate, this view suggests that
Congress would not have the constitutional power to regulate. These
situations demonstrate the fallacy of according power based purely on
historical practice.
Yet in both Lopez and Morrison, the Court justified its decision in
large part due to respect for traditional state governmental functions,
but did not provide any meaningful way to distinguish what those
functions might be. 43  For example, the VAWA "focused. .. upon
documented deficiencies in state legal systems" and was "tailored ... to
prevent its use in certain areas of traditional state concern, such as
137. Wille, supra note 3o, at 1077 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 39-40 (Alexander Hamilton),
No. 22, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)); see also Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 522.
138. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) '(quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 66-67 (1937)).
139. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
334-45 (2007).
140. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) ("We therefore
now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal
regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral'
or 'traditional."').
141. For example, trash collection has never been a traditional governmental function in the
western United States. If we apply the traditional governmental function test, the federal government
should regulate trash collection because historically the states have not wielded primary regulatory
authority. Yet states are perfectly competent to regulate trash collection and thus should be accorded
primary constitutional power. See infra Part III.
142. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; cf id. at 580-83 (i995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that
Congress's commerce power should be constrained where exercise of that power would conflict with
subjects of traditional state police powers).
143. See Mank, supra note 12, at 406 & n.146.
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divorce, alimony, or child custody."'" Such tailoring shows that Congress
carefully analyzed whether the states were separately competent to
handle the problem of violence against women and accurately
determined the extent of the states' limitations, even while protecting
"historic spheres of state sovereignty."'" Nonetheless, the Court struck
down the legislation as exceeding Congress's commerce power, without
considering whether the states could effectively regulate the activity at
issue.
Distinguishing traditional state governmental functions in the
environmental context presents even more analytical difficulties, in large
part because so much environmental regulation has occurred since 1960.
For example, in SWANCC, the Court implied that regulation of isolated
wetlands trenched upon traditional state authority over land and water
use.146 However, the Court failed to recognize that environmental
regulation is quite distinct from land-use regulation. 47 This categorical
confusion demonstrates the malleability of the traditional state
governmental function test, and its inability to determine which
sovereign should regulate. Nevertheless, these arguments continue to be
deployed, despite the fact that the test has been specifically rejected as a
limiting principle in Commerce Clause cases.'14
Finally, applying the traditional governmental function test prevents
citizens from knowing which government is responsible for their
problems.
The theory that two governments accord more liberty than one
requires for its realization two distinct and discernable lines of political
accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal Government;
the second between the citizens and the States. If, as Madison
expected, the Federal and State Governments are to control each other
and hold each other in check by competing for the affections of the
people, those citizens must have some means of knowing which of the
two governments to hold accountable for the failure to perform a given
function. "Federalism serves to assign political responsibility, not to
obscure it." Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation
of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do
with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between
the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political
responsibility would become illusory. The resultant inability to hold
either branch of the government answerable to the citizens is more
144. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 662 (2000) (Breyer, J.. dissenting).
145. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2oo5) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146. 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
147. Id. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The [Clean Water Act] is not a land-use code; it is a
paradigm of environmental regulation."); see also Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S.
572, 586-87 (1987) (federal environmental legislation is different in kind than state land use
regulation).
148. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 645-52 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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dangerous even than devolving too much authority to the remote
central power. 49
This argument illustrates the importance of the federalism concerns
underlying a principled application of the Commerce Clause. Citizens
unable to determine which government is responsible for protecting the
environment will be unable to determine which legislator or executive
agency to hold accountable. However, Justice Kennedy's reliance on
traditional state governmental functions does not address which
sovereign should handle new problems or problems beyond states'
capacity to regulate what was traditionally within the states' purview. In
this way, relying on traditional roles does not lead to "distinct and
discernable lines of political accountability."'50 Instead, a standard that
accords default power to the states, except where there is a national
impact or the states are separately incompetent, would better clarify
political accountability.,'
D. FORMALIST STANDARDS ARE UNWORKABLE AND AT ODDS WITH THE
FRAMERS' PRINCIPLES
Yet another reason why the economic/noneconomic distinction
should be abandoned is that, as a matter of judicial review, applying the
distinction does not produce a "workable judicial Commerce Clause
touchstone-a set of comprehensible interpretive rules that courts might
use."' 52 Applying the new formalist test is not an easy undertaking.'
Furthermore, there is no apparent stopping point to federal power under
this formalist analysis: "To draw the line wherever private activity affects
the demand for market goods is to draw no line at all, and to declare
everything economic."," Add in consideration of the established
exceptions-for aggregation of noneconomic activity occurring at
economic enterprises and for intrastate, noneconomic activities if the
regulation is necessary to avoid undermining a comprehensive regulatory
scheme-and the task of discerning the proper spheres of authority
becomes a formidable, if not absurd, judicial task.' Perhaps this explains
149. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations
omitted) (quoting FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992)) (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos.
46, 51 (James Madison)).
150. Id. at 576.
151. See infra Part III.B.
152. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656 (Breyer J., dissenting).
153. See Gil Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext Analysis in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 78
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1251, 1276-87 (2003) (analyzing problematic discernment of economic from
noneconomic activities).
154. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. i, 50 (2oo5) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'55. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656-57 (Breyer J., dissenting); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627-
29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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why so few lower courts carried out the federalism revolution that many
predicted would follow Lopez."6
Moreover, this approach focuses exclusively on cause, without
adequately addressing the effect on interstate commerce.' Indeed,
"[the] Court has long held that only the interstate commercial effects, not
the local nature of the cause, are constitutionally relevant."'"8 Focusing
only on cause would rob Commerce Clause jurisprudence of any
substantive connection to reality. "If chemical emanations through
indirect environmental change cause identical, severe commercial harm
outside a State, why should it matter whether local factories or home
fireplaces release them?"' 59 In this way, employing this formalist test
ignores on-the-ground realities. But, "[m]ost importantly, the Court's
complex rules seem unlikely to help secure the very object that they
seek, namely, the protection of 'areas of traditional state regulation' from
federal intrusion." 60 The Court would do well to examine whether there
is a national impact or whether the states are separately incompetent.
This analytical paradigm would address the Morrison dissent's pragmatic
argument and would achieve the federalism goals desired by the
Morrison majority.
The Court's formalist analytic paradigm empowers the judiciary to
make policy decisions at the expense of legislature. Yet Justice Kennedy
pointed out in concurrence in Lopez that the Framers envisioned that
the political process would be the main determinant of balance between
national and state power, and so Congress should be accorded
substantial discretion. 6 ' This practical awareness dictates that "politics,
not judicial review, should mediate between state and national interests
as the strength and legislative jurisdiction of the National Government
inevitably increase[s] through the expected growth of the national
economy.",I62 Indeed, in Gibbons, "Chief Justice Marshall . . . made
156. See generally Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, Or
What If the Supreme Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2ooo Wis. L. REV. 369.
157. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656-58 (Breyer J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 657.
159. Id.
16o. Id. at 658 (quoting id. at 615 (majority opinion)).
161. United States v. Lopez, 594 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 137, at 295); see also Wechsler, supra note 136, at 558
("If this analysis is correct [that the states influence national policy formation], the national political
process in the United States-and especially the role of the states in the composition and selection of
the central government-is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the
center on the domain of the states.").
162. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 647 (Souter, J., dissenting); see 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN I787, at 438-39 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (Remarks of James
Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention, Oct. 28, 5787); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
I, 197 (5824) ("The wisdom and discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the
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emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of [the commerce] power
by warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from
political rather than from judicial processes.""' Despite these
admonitions, the Court's formalist focus on whether the regulated
activity is "economic" precludes consideration of federalism principles of
comparative competence.
Finally, the judiciary is not as well suited to make factual inquiries
into whether an activity is "economic" and thus a legitimate object of
federal legislation. Courts must accept facts as presented by parties and
cannot conduct fact-finding inquiries independent of a concrete legal
dispute. Legislatures, however, are not bound by these procedural rules.
As a result:
Courts must give Congress a degree of leeway in determining the
existence of a significant factual connection between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce-both because the Constitution
delegates the commerce power directly to Congress and because the
determination requires an empirical judgment of a kind that a
legislature is more likely than a court to make with accuracy. 64
Not only does Congress have greater fact-finding resources, it more
accurately represents the interests of states than does the federal
judiciary. "Congress is institutionally motivated to [strike the appropriate
federal/state balance]. Its Members represent state and local district
interests."' 65 Therefore, not only does Congress have greater capacity to
study the national impact of the legislation, but its institutional
composition also suggests it is the most appropriate body to do so.
III. THE NATIONAL IMPACT TEST BEST SERVES THE PURPOSES OF THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
This Part sets forth a national impact test to determine the scope of
Congress's commerce power. In the previous Part, this Note analyzed the
text, the principles undergirding our Constitutional structure, the
resolutions adopted at the Philadelphia Convention in 1789, the
federalism goals advocated by the Framers, and the comparative
strengths of the co-equal branches. These sources indicate that Congress
should be empowered to regulate pursuant to the commerce power
influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that,
for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its
abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative
governments.").
163. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. II, 120 (1942) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197).
164. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Robert A. Schapiro & William W.
Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication. 88
CORNELL L. Ray. 1I99, 1257-61 (2003) (arguing that the Court did not clarify what activities can be
regulated under the Commerce Clause and bestowed too much discretion on trial courts).
165. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 66i (Breyer. J., dissenting).
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wherever an activity has a national impact or the states are separately
incompetent to effectively address it. In so doing, Commerce Clause
jurisprudence must therefore shift away from formalist and disingenuous
considerations of whether an activity is "economic" toward a
competency-driven analysis. This Part sets out a national impact test and
defines when the test justifies legislation pursuant to Congress's
commerce power.
Doctrinally, my national impact test can be viewed in two ways.
First, it can be considered to encapsulate the whole Commerce Clause
edifice of channels, instrumentalities, and effects on interstate commerce.
Indeed, this test already attempts to identify which commercial activities
would most likely have a national impact or those that the states would
most likely not be able to effectively regulate on their own. Second, the
national impact test can be viewed as a replacement of the substantial
effects prong. Instead of examining whether the legislation regulates an
"economic" activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, this
test will evaluate which sovereign has the capability to regulate.
A. DEFINING THE NATIONAL IMPACT TEST
What is a national impact? When are the states separately
incompetent? Three classes of issues can be identified under this
framework: (i) issues explicitly national in nature, (2) issues where states
are affected by a single problem that crosses state borders, and (3) issues
that individual states cannot resolve due to self-interested incentives.
i. Problems That Affect the Nation as a Whole
These problems affect the entire nation. As one commentator
suggested, these issues are
"national in nature[,]" . . . [which] means those kinds of things which
fall within the reason and purpose for which the formation of the union
was necessary. Specifically it means those matters that require national
uniformity in order to be effectively regulated. It means also those
matters or activities which cannot be effectively regulated by efforts of
the several states acting severally and separately within their own local
dominion."
As such, "a national interest is one that can only be exercised or
defended by the nation in its entirety."567 This prong requires the
problem to be national in scope such that every state is affected.
Because the states have plenary power, "[i]f Congress is going to
displace state and local authority, it should be because there has been an
explicit, national debate identifying an overriding national interest or
166. Lacour, supra note 93, at 200.
167. Kmiec, supra note 107, at 564-65.
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state regulatory incapacity." 6 8 Congress must be the site of this debate,
because the Constitution grants this deliberative power to the legislative
branch.6' Granting Congress power according to a national impact
inquiry requires Congress to address the scope and justification for the
legislation.
The regulatory state largely exists under the executive branch,
pursuant to delegated power from Congress and limited by the
separation of powers.' Accordingly, the courts should differentiate the
level of scrutiny between congressional legislation and regulations
promulgated by an executive agency."' SWANCC's rationale accords
with this principle because the SWANCC Court rejected the Corps'
statutory interpretation, rather than reach the constitutional issue,
finding that Congress had not spoken directly to the issue.7 2 Therefore,
where Congress has explicitly legislated on a problem that significantly
affects the entire nation, its legislation should pass muster under the
Commerce Clause.
Additionally, the government should be empowered to regulate
issues of national concern that states cannot effectively regulate by
themselves. For example, slavery, segregation, and legal racial
discrimination adversely impact the fundamental national value of
equality under the law. Although the Supreme Court has upheld civil
rights legislation as regulation of activities substantially affecting
interstate commerce, a more principled explanation justifying the
legislation emphasizes the states' inability to adequately address this
issue of national import."'
Another example is protection of the American flag. Although
struck down as an unconstitutional restriction on free speech, the Flag
Protection Act of 1989 sought to protect a national symbol, which all
Americans share and which the states certainly do not control.'74
168. Id. at 570-71-
169. See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 164, at 1267-76 (advocating a "legislativist" approach that
the "statute's text should guide the courts.").
170. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983) (holding that Congress cannot delegate
its lawmaking authority to the Executive branch).
171. Delegation of regulatory authority cannot include delegations of constitutional authority. See,
e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 173-74 (2001)
(holding that Congress had failed to explicitly regulate isolated wetlands under the Clean Water Act
and, as a result, the Army Corps of Engineers had exceeded its statutory authority in so regulating).
172. Id. at 170-74 (reasoning that Congress had not made a clear statement concerning regulation
of abandoned mines).
173. During the Cold War, Soviet propagandists referred extensively to the injustice of American
race relations to undermine the United States claim of providing freedom to all peoples within a
market democracy. Similarly, al Qaeda emphasized the social injustice evident in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina. Granting the federal government power to regulate these issues affecting our
national security reflects an awareness of each sovereign's competence.
174. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 31o, 3 14-19 (1990).
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Similarly, the Bald Eagle Protection Act protects our national bird,
another noncommercial symbol that Congress must have the power to
regulate to safeguard our national heritage.' In these cases, the national
values implicated suggest that Congress must have the power to regulate
these issues.
2. Where Multiple States Are Affected by a Single Problem and
Seek Federal Regulation
Occasionally, states seek federal regulation due to their recognized
inability to achieve their purposes. For example, in Morrison, Justice
Souter bemoaned the fact that "the States will be forced to enjoy the new
federalism whether they want it or not."'" In that case, thirty-six states
and Puerto Rico had expressed their support for the VAWA in an
amicus curiae brief because they viewed state efforts as insufficient to
combat the problem.78 Nevertheless, the Court rejected the VAWA as
beyond the federal government's commerce power. In situations where
the states have recognized their own incapacity to manage a problem and
have affirmatively sought congressional legislation to remedy those
problems, courts should not preclude federal legislation addressing such
topics.,
This prong is relevant in the environmental context because effects
(like air pollution) can be felt across borders, regardless of the cause's
locus. In these circumstances, "decentralized environmental
decisionmaking would remain flawed because spillover impacts of
decisions in one jurisdiction on well being in other jurisdictions generate
conflicts and welfare losses not easily remedied under a decentralized
regime.""'5 The result of these effects is that the states cannot adequately
address these issues individually. In these contexts, the federal
government should be empowered to legislate.
175. See 16 U.S.C. §H 668-668d (2oo6).
176. See David L. Faigman, By What Authority?: Reflections on the Constitutionality and Wisdom
of the Flag Protection Act, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 353, 356-65 ('990) (arguing that protecting the
American flag is a fundamental interest justifying congressional power, but subject to the First
Amendment's constraints); see also Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318 ("Government may create national
symbols, promote them, and encourage their respectful treatment. But the Flag Protection Act of 1989
goes well beyond this by criminally proscribing expressive conduct because of its likely communicative
impact." (footnote omitted)).
177. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,654 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
178. See id., Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners' Brief on
the Merits, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), 1999 WL 10328o9.
179. Cf, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144. 174-77 (1992) (striking down a coercive
"take title" provision, yet upholding noncoercive solutions to the national problem of low-level
radioactive waste proposed by the states as permissible "cooperative federalism").
i8o. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. I1196, I1215 (197~7) -
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3. Where Individual States Are Incapable of Resolving the Problem
on Their Own
This prong requires evidence that individual states could not address
the problem in isolation without federal regulation. This is the heart of
the test's federalist allure and counteracts Justice Breyer's endlessly
aggregative "costs of crime" reasoning.' One commentator warns that
"[d]emonstrated state incapacity must be theoretically as well as
practically grounded, not merely rhetorically asserted by a group of state
officials that have grown accustomed to federal direction and subsidy."S2
For example, in Lopez, the Court encountered a situation where states
were separately competent to handle the issue of guns in school zones
and already had effective legislation in place. In his concurrence, Justice
Kennedy explicitly acknowledged that the states are separately
competent to regulate guns in school zones when he noted that forty
states currently have legislation banning such possession, implying that
the federal government had nothing to contribute to the state
responses.'8 ' This evidence, in the absence of states seeking federal
assistance-as in Morrison -suggests that the states are separately
competent.
One instance where the states may be rendered separately
incompetent may arise in the context of a prisoner's dilemma. In the
environmental context, this is usually termed a regulatory "race to the
bottom," wherein states are incentivized to reduce regulatory rents (i.e.,
environmental controls) to attract business to their state.'84 Because the
label "race to the bottom" can be misapplied and because establishing its
real and pernicious effects would legitimize federal legislation,'85
Congress should verify the empirical reality of a race to the bottom
before it merits deference from the courts.
The Court confronted the race-to-the-bottom issue when it
evaluated the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 in the companion cases Hodel v. Vir inia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n 8 6 and Hodel v. Indiana.' In
181. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 615-44 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. Kmiec, supra note 1o7, at 565.
183. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
184. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-
Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, I2IO-II, 1213-19
(1992) (defining "race to the bottom" as "a race from the desirable levels of environmental quality
that states would pursue if they did not face competition for industry to the increasingly undesirable
levels that they choose in the face of such competition," but arguing that the reliance on this rationale
has been overblown and empirically suspect).
185. See id.
186. 452 U.S. 264, 275-93, 304-05 (1981) (holding that the "steep-slope' provisions were within
Congress's commerce power).




Virginia Surface Mining, the Court held the Act valid, finding that
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the absence of federal
legislation would likely lead to ruinous competition among states in
lowering environmental standards in order to retain or attract business
from other states.'8  The Court noted, "The [Senate and House]
Committees also explained that inadequacies in existing state laws and
the need for uniform minimum nationwide standards made federal
regulations imperative.""' Thus, the Court reasoned that Congress may
enact legislation under the Commerce Clause to prevent states from
engaging ina race to the bottom.'t The Court justified preventing this
race to the bottom based on the substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
However, a simpler and more coherent explanation would have
been to acknowledge that the states' proven incentive to engage in a race
to the bottom rendered the states separately incompetent to regulate the
activity in question. Indeed, if the states cannot effectively regulate these
"exclusively internal" issues and Congress is constitutionally precluded
from regulating, then no sovereign would be able to cure the problem. In
light of these considerations, the significant deleterious impacts of
allowing such a race to ensue elevated the problem to one of national
impact and significance.' 9 ' This example nicely illustrates Congress's
institutional sensitivity to the states' political shortcomings.
B. JUSTIFYING THE NATIONAL IMPACT TEST
Compared to the formalist consideration of whether a regulated
activity is "economic," the national impact test provides a more coherent
principle for both granting and denying Constitutional power.
Additionally, the test adheres more closely to the Framers' federalism,
makes better structural sense, and provides a more workable judicial
test.'92
i. The National Impact Test Addresses Federalism Concerns More
Effectively
Relying on formalist distinctions such as economic/noneconomic,193
direct/indirect,194 and commerce/manufacture' 95 results in arbitrary results
188. 452 U.S. at 281-82.
189. Id. at 280.
190. Id. at 281-82. See generally Neal D. Woods, Interstate Competition and Environmental
Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis, 87 Soc. Sc. Q. 174 (2004) (empirical evidence
confirms that states regulating surface mining engage in a regulatory race to the bottom).
191. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 281-82.
192. My thanks to Professor David L. Faigman for clarifying the import and force of these points.
'93. See, eg, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 ('995); see also, e.g , United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 6xo-II (2000).
'94. See, e.g., AL.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546-48 ('935).
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from a federalism perspective.196 To the contrary, national impact
analysis requires direct consideration of the proper sphere of governing
authority. Generally, police power remains with the states, as it always
has been in our constitutional scheme.'" By applying the national impact
test, "the states do not, as a practical matter, lose any power they now
possess, for the application of federal power ... is posited on the
assumption that the states are separately unable to take effective
action."'9 Where the states cannot effectively take action on their own
and have not historically done so, Congress's commerce power should be
interpreted to allow Congress to regulate purely intrastate activities.
Interpreting the Commerce Clause in this manner allows the states to
continue to serve as laboratories of experimentation,' 99 while avoiding a
race-to-the-bottom scenario. Additionally, applying this test more
accurately reflects the Framers' principles.'
Courts applying the test will incentivize Congress to proactively
evaluate whether the legislation at issue actually addresses an issue of
national impact or whether the states are separately incompetent to
regulate. This deliberative process will have the salutary effect of
heightening political responsibility. For example, citizens will know that
states have primary legislative authority to deal with issues affecting
commerce, particularly environmental issues. But, when a state is not
competent to deal with the problem at hand or the problem is national in
scope, citizens will know that the federal government has the power to
regulate and can backstop the states.
Under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, courts
must analyze the jurisdictional hook of a statute.20 ' In dissent in Raich,
Justice O'Connor rightly rejected this practice as a drafting requirement
that could be avoided by artful legislators.202 The national impact test
cannot be a drafting requirement but must be a robust evaluative tool
that legislators, judges, and citizens can rely on to locate the proper
regulating authority.
195. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. i, 24-26 (1888).
196. See supra Part II.C.
197. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison), supra note 137, at 292 ("The powers delegated
by the proposed constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the state governments are numerous and indefinite.").
198. Stern, supra note 30, at 1363.
199. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("One of federalism's
chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that 'a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."' (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 58i
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200. See supra Part II.B.
2o1. Raich, 545 U.S. at 4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
202. See id. at 46-47-
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2. The National Impact Test Allocates Power According to
Structural Competence
This principled approach makes more structural sense because it
allocates power according to competence. Current jurisprudence
questions whether an activity is economic, not which sovereign most
appropriately can solve the problem. "Instead of asking how much out-
of-state beef Ollie's Barbecue buys each month or whether violence
against women affects the national economy, [functional analysis] directs
a court to ask which body can best solve the underlying problem and best
serve the legislative objective."'03
As such, the national impact test more properly counters both
externalities generated by other states and the collective action
problem.0 4 Problems that cross state lines inherently lead to problems
developing among the states.05 But, as the Supreme Court has noted, the
Constitution was designed to ameliorate theseyroblems that plagued the
Union under the Articles of Confederation? "[The Constitution] was
framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink
or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division."" Comprehensive national legislation defeats
the free rider problem of collective action and overcomes state
intransigence. For example, in 1969, Ohio's inability to adequately
control pollution in its waterways led to the Cuyahoga River catching
fire.2os This vivid image led Congress to enact the Clean Water Act.2
Because the Clean Water Act imposed national minimum standards,
"[o]ur Nation's waters no longer burn."2 O Therefore, allocating power
according to competence better redresses these especially problematic
obstacles for environmental regulation than the current "substantial
effects" test.
Other constitutional principles demonstrate the structural wisdom
of predicating regulatory authority on comparative competence rather
than formalist analysis of whether an activity is "economic." The Tenth
Amendment reserves primary regulatory authority to the states, but
203. Anna Johnson Cramer, Note, The Right Results for All the Wrong Reasons: An Historical and
Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53 VAND. L. REV. 271, 290 (2ooo).
204. JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 19 (2d ed. 2007)
(describing how nonparticipating, "free rider" actors can hold out and increase transaction costs in
negotiating solutions.).
205. This is the chief rationale of the federal judiciary enforcing the dormant or negative aspect of
the Commerce Clause.
206. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 ('935).
207. Id.
208. See Solid waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. '59, 174-75
(2oox) (Stevens, J.. dissenting).
209. See id.
21o. Id. at 175.
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recognizes that the people, through their congressional representatives,
may desire the United States to respond to national issues not explicitly
considered by the Constitution's text." Dormant commerce clause
principles require striking down state legislative schemes that undermine
national harmony, suggesting that the federal government must be able
to regulate in areas prone to interstate competition."' Applying the
dormant commerce clause in the environmental context, the Court has
recognized that "states do not 'own' the wildlife within their borders and
that state laws regulating wildlife are subordinate to congressional
legislation under the Commerce Clause."2 I3 Finally, the Article II treaty
power allows the federal government to subject the states to national
uniform legislation of strictly noncommercial objects.21 4 The scope of this
power comports with one commentator's view that "[t]he grant of
interstate commerce power was designed to enable regulation in
furtherance of the purpose of the Commerce Clause-the promotion of
foreign commerce." 21' This drafting, along with the three foreign trade-
based hypotheticals employed by the Constitutional Convention, affirms
that Congress has the power to legislate on issues that impact the entire
nation."6 These ideals underlie the Commerce Clause-enabling
Congress to confront national issues while preventing disunity sowed by
the states.
3. The National Impact Test Provides a More Workable Judicial
Framework
Yet another benefit of the national impact test is that it will
facilitate judicial determinations of the constitutionality of legislation.
211. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
212. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) ("The central
rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local
economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the
Constitution was designed to prevent.").
213. Mank, supra note 12, at 430 (footnote omitted) (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
329-35 (1979)); see also Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 286 (1977) (holding that
Congress had power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the taking of certain fish from state
waters-thus preempting conflicting state laws-because, as such fish moved during their life cycle
without regard to state boundaries, they could not be regulated by each state in which they were found
without creating a "Balkanization of interstate commercial activity that the Constitution was intended
to prevent").
214. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1918).
215. Cramer, supra note 203, at 276.
216. Id. at 276 n.29 ("The Commerce Clause points toward regulation of foreign commerce
because all three types of hypothetical legislation proposed by the Framers were designed to eliminate
strains on foreign commerce. The Framers' federalist views indicate that they would not have passed a
broad interstate commerce power that invaded the police power of the states. Combined, both of these
portend a broad foreign commerce power and an interstate commerce power for use only to aid
foreign commerce.").
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Because Congress will be incentivized to develop ample evidence of its
intent and findings of national impact and states' incompetency to
regulate, courts will have a more developed record of legislative facts to
consider in adjudications.2 As previously stated, this very process will
bring state interests to light. Moreover, judges already know how to
distinguish when the states are separately incompetent.
Even so, certainty is not the only ultimate goal of applying the
national impact test. For "so long as those enumerated powers are
interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional
legislation under the Commerce Clause always will engender 'legal
uncertainty."' 219 Given this reality, the national impact test does not
annihilate the problem of uncertainty, but instead deploys analytic tools
that better reflect the principles distinguishing the appropriate spheres of
regulatory power. Due to this uncertainty, the Court employs rational
basis review so that "[t]he judicial task is at an end once the [C]ourt
determines that Congress acted rationally in adopting a particular
regulatory scheme."220 Indeed, in the Commerce Clause context, the
Court has long purported to engage in rational basis review, considering
merely whether Congress could rationally conclude that a regulated
activity significantly affected interstate commerce."' However, the Court
has recently employed a higher level of scrutiny to both category findings
and findings of fact.222
217. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARV. L. REv. 364, 402-10(1942) (distinguishing between legislative facts and adjudicative facts).
218. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 6io (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen faced
with two plausible interpretations of a federal criminal statute, we generally will take the alternative
that does not force us to impute an intention to Congress to use its full commerce power to regulate
conduct traditionally and ably regulated by the States."); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 636 n.io (2ooo) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("I and other Members of this Court appearing before
Congress have repeatedly argued against the federalization of traditional state crimes and the
extension of federal remedies to problems for which the States have historically taken responsibility
and may deal with today if they have the will to do so.").
219. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (quoting id. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
22o. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981).
221. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557; id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80;
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (197'); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964). But see Hodel, 452
U.S at 311 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[S]imply because Congress may conclude that
a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so."); Heart
of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273 (Black, J., concurring) ("[W]hether particular operations affect
interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them
is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this
Court.").
222. Compare Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (finding of fact not by itself sufficient to justify the
VAWA under the Commerce Clause), with Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (absence of congressional factual
findings to justify Gun Free School Zones Act not necessarily fatal, but also unhelpful as far as
justifying use of Congress's Commerce Clause authority).
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Courts' analyses should recognize that Congress is better
institutionally suited to conduct factual inquiries on economic effects,
both due to its political constituency, and to the wealth of analytical tools
at its disposal.223 Of course, where fundamental rights are implicated,
courts should engage in a more searching standard of review.224 But
courts should employ comparatively lower standards of review where
legislation affecting economic activity is at issue. Commerce Clause cases
generally do not implicate fundamental rights and, thus, a heightened
standard of review is not appropriate. Indeed, heightened review of
economic legislation has been discredited since the Court's unfortunate
experience following Lochner v. New York.225 Thus, courts evaluating
Congress's factual findin gs of national impact or separate incompetence
should be deferential." The Court should continue its practice of
reviewing factual determinations in Commerce Clause cases using a
rational basis standard.
IV. APPLYING THE NATIONAL IMPACT TEST To FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
This Part deploys the national impact test to determine the
constitutionality of federal environmental legislation. Environmental
issues are different from most strictly intrastate commercial problems in
part because their locus is much more difficult to identify.2 2 7 Laws
regulating endangered species, greenhouse gas emissions, and
groundwater address issues that affect the nation as a whole or cannot be
effectively countered by states acting individually. "[B]ecause the risk to
the integrated national economy posed by loss or destruction of these
resources cannot be confined to individual states,""8 federal legislation
ameliorating those risks must be within Congress's regulatory
223. See supra Part II.D.
224. See Amicus Brief of Constitutional Law Professors, David L. Faigman et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Nos. 05-38o, 05-1382), reprinted
in 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69 (2oo6); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (advocating a more searching review where the Bill of Rights is implicated).
225. 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604-o7 (Souter, J., dissenting) (comparing pre-New
Deal cases striking down federal legislation as beyond Congress's commerce power with cases
rejecting federal interference in economic regulation under the Court's substantive due process
jurisprudence).
226. See Amicus Brief of Constitutional Law Professors, supra note 224, at 4-5.
227. See, e.g, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504-09 (2007) (noting that while greenhouse
gas emissions are caused globally, they affect the entire United States); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972) (describing Illinois's claim that although the cause of the water pollution was in
Wisconsin, the effect of raw sewage in drinking water was in Illinois); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230, 236-39 (1907) (discussing how the cause of the air pollution was located in Tennessee,
but the effect produced by acid rain was experienced in Georgia).
228. Cramer, supra note 203, at 309-
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authority.2 29 Analysis of those laws, then, suggests the constitutionality of
federal legislation on those topics. Of course, Congress could rely on its
treaty or its spending powers to regulate in these areas.230 Additionally,
Congress could argue that all species crossing federal property can be
regulated pursuant to the Property Clause.23' However, this Note focuses
on Congress's power pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Applying a traditional functional analysis, unmoored from the
limiting principles inherent in the Framers' federalist design, presents
difficult analytical problems and could lead to precedent suggesting that
Congress can legislate in any field.232  For that reason, Part V
demonstrates how use of the national impact test can more coherently
differentiate those areas that should remain under the plenary authority
of the states.
A. WILDLIFE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
When Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act (ESA), it
explicitly recognized the national import of protecting species and their
habitats in distinctly noneconomic terms.3 At the same time, the House
Report associated with the enactment of the ESA suggested the vast
economic (and medicinal) implications of protecting those species.
Thus, the ESA represents a paradigm example of where a noneconomic
and noncommercial object of regulation (endangered species)
229. For an argument that all federal environmental legislation has a national impact, see Richard
B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good in a Federal State, 1997 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 199.
Stewart argues that Americans "regard environmental quality as an important national good that
transcends individual or local interest." Id. at 210.
230. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) ("Here a national interest of very nearly the
first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another
power. The subject-matter is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein.
But for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see
nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and
the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely upon the States.
The reliance is vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether the United States is forbidden to
act. We are of opinion that the treaty and statute must be upheld."); see also South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987) (allowing Congress to exert its spending power to encourage, but not
coerce, state regulatory programs).
231. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See generally John D. Leshy, A Property Clause of the Twenty-
First Century, 75 U. COLo. L. REV. 1101 (2004).
232. See, e.g., Cramer, supra note 203, at 306-09.
233. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (2oo6) (endangered and threatened species "are of esthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the nation and its people"); see
also Nagle, supra note ii, at 193 ("[T]he ESA contains several findings about the importance of
endangered species . . . .").
234. H.R. REP. NO. 93-412. at 4-5 (1973): see also Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483. 497-99 (4th Cir.
2000) (holding that Congress's future-economic-benefit rationale supported its use of Commerce
Clause power); Nat'1 Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt (NAHB), 130 F.3d 1041, 1052-54 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (same).
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nonetheless has a significant national impact, both in economic and
noneconomic terms.
However, the ESA is problematic under Lopez-informed
Commerce Clause analysis because "[a]bout half of all endangered or
threatened species have habitats limited to one state, and many intrastate
species have little economic value in interstate commerce. Similarly,
many other threatened or endangered species that cross state lines lack
significant commercial value."' Although some scholars have argued
that Congress cannot extend the ESA to apply to entirely intrastate
species with no commercial value, Professor Mank nicely refutes this
argument:
The ESA's policy of preserving biodiversity meets the Court's
substantial-effects-on-interstate-commerce standard for the Commerce
Clause because the ESA produces significant current economic
benefits to interstate commerce. Because preserving genetic diversity
may lessen the spread of diseases, protect food sources, and provide
medicines, the ESA's policy of preserving biodiversity by protecting all
threatened and endangered species-not just those that have direct
commercial value-is a rational policy that sufficiently promotes the
economic value of interstate commerce to be constitutional under the
Commerce Clause.236
Professor Mank's analysis justifies the ESA's constitutionality under
current doctrine. Although appellate courts deployed inconsistent
analyses to post-Lopez challenges to the ESA, the Supreme Court
appeared to accept Mank's argument by denying certiorari in the long-
watched GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton case.
235. Mank, supra note 12, at 428 & n.256 (citing GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622,
624 (5th Cir. 2003) (six species of subterranean, cave-dwelling invertebrate spiders and beetles living
only in Texas); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1o62, 'o69 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (arroyo toad living
only in California); NAHB, 130 F-3d at 3o43 (Delhi Sand Flower-Loving Fly living only in California)).
During Chief Justice John Roberts's confirmation process, then-Judge Roberts was harshly criticized
by four Senators for his opinion where he questioned Congress's authority regulate the (as he called it)
"hapless toad." See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1o9th Cong. (2oo5); see
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d I158, II6o (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
236. Mank, supra note 12, at 446 (footnote omitted); see also H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (stating
that the value of the planet's biological "genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable"). However,
application of Raich's comprehensive-regulatory-scheme rationale would most likely allow the federal
government to reach intrastate, non-commercial species because "the courts have no power 'to excise,
as trivial, individual instances of the class."' 545 U.S. I, 23 (2005) (quoting Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146, 154 (1971)).
237. 326 F.3d 622, cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); see also Michael C. Blumm & George A.
Kimbrell, Gonzales v. Raich, the "Comprehensive Scheme" Principle, and the Constitutionality of the
Endangered Species Act, 35 ENVTrL. L. 491, 494 (2005) ("The Raich decision's aftershock on the ESA
was apparently obvious to the Court: The Monday following the filing of the Raich decision, after
holding the GDF Realty petition for more than a year (presumably while waiting for the Raich
decision), the Court denied certiorari in GDF Realty without comment.").
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Despite this judicial uncertainty, it is readily apparent that the ESA
regulates activities that affect the nation as a whole. The Fourth Circuit,
in a pre-Raich case, considered the issue ina manner reflective of the
national impact test, answering in the affirmative the question "whether
the national government can act to conserve scarce natural resources of
value to our entire country."32 Similarly, in its first consideration of the
scope of the ESA, the Supreme Court noted that Congress recognized
the importance of protecting biodiversity and ecosystems to the
economy: "Congress was concerned about the unknown uses that
endangered species might have and about the unforeseeable place such
creatures may have in the chain of life on this planet.""' The Court relied
heavily upon the pertinent House Report, which stated that "[t]he value
of [the planet's biological] genetic heritage is, quite literally,
incalculable."2 40  These statements of national impact confirm the
constitutionality of federal legislation under the Commerce Clause.
Even if a court did not consider these national effects sufficient to
justify federal regulation, the ESA would also be legitimate as a
regulation on a topic that the states could not separately address.
Congress designed the ESA to provide for concurrent federal and state
regulation, implicitly recognizing that the ESA only provides a backstop
to state control over biological resources." Congress thus provided its
own limiting factor, keyed to federalism concerns.2" Every five years, the
Secretary of the Interior must revisit its listing decisions. When a
species no longer is endangered or threatened, the statute requires that
the federal government should no longer regulate that species and return
authority over that species to the states.?4 By creating a federalism-
inspired regime that prioritizes comparative competence, particularly in
an area of long-standing, concurrent regulation, the ESA does not
interfere excessively with traditional state authority."5
238. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 486 (emphasis added).
239. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178-79 (1978).
240. Id. at 178 (emphasis omitted) (quoting H.R .REP. No. 93-412, at 4).
241. See 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (2oo6); Mank, supra note 12, at 427.
242. See Mank, supra note 12, at 445; see also GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639-40 (discussing how
protection of endangered and threatened species is of national interest and the ESA's limiting
principle comports with Morrison and Lopez).
243. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2)(A)-(B)(i) ("The Secretary shall ... conduct, at least once every
five years, a review of all species . . . and ... determine on the basis of such review whether any such
species should.. . be removed from the list . . . .").
244. See id. § 1532(3) (defining "conservation" as "the use of all methods and procedures which
are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures
provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary"); see also Mank, supra note 12, at 445.
245. See Mank. supra note 12, at 429-35 (discussing federalism arrangements regarding wildlife
and history of federal regulation over wildlife). For history of federal regulation over threatened and
endangered species, see, for example, Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187, 187-89 (1900) (codified as
amended at x6 U.S.C. §§ 7o1, 3371-3378 (2006 & Supp. 2008), which was enacted to prohibit the
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Another aspect of the ESA demonstrates its legitimacy under the
third prong of the national impact test: According to the House Report
associated with the ESA, "[p]rotection of endangered species is not a
matter that can be handled in absence of coherent national and
international policies; the results of a series of unconnected and
disorganized policies and programs by various states might well be
confusion compounded."5246 This finding illustrates explicit congressional
consideration of whether the states are separately competent to handle
the problem of preserving endangered species and their requisite habitat.
Furthermore, this finding also suggests that Congress sought to prevent
destructive interstate competition by enacting the ESA.247  Thus,
Congress's power can also be legitimized under the third prong of the
national impact test.4
B. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT
In 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that the EPA had statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air
Act. 49 Although Congress did not make specific findings regarding the
national impact of greenhouse gas emissions in the Clean Air Act, it had
recognized the problem's pervasive nature in at least two other
statutes.2 0 Greenhouse gas emissions cause climate change and the harms
inflicted by that climate change will affect the entire nation.25' Because
those problems will affect the entire nation's economy, Congress should
have regulatory power under the first prong of national impact analysis.
interstate transport of animals killed in violation of state law. Accord Migratory Bird Treaty Act of
1918, 16 U.S.C. §H 703-712 (prohibiting taking of migratory birds and preempting state law under
Congress's treaty power); Bald Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 76-567, 54 Stat. 250, 25o-5I (1940)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d) (banning the taking, possession, sale, or export of bald eagles).
246. H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 7 (1973).
247. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt (NAHB), 130 F.3d 1041, 1054-57 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (applying the rationale of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n-permitting
congressional regulation to prevent a race to the bottom among the states-to the ESA); Mank, supra
note 12, at 442 & n.332 (pointing out the similarities between the ESA and the Surface Mining Act).
248. The ESA could also be deemed constitutional as legislation necessary to implement an
international agreement under the Treaty Power of Article II. Cf Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
430-35 (1920) (upholding legislation regulating intrastate noncommercial hunting as a necessary and
proper enactment for implementing the Migratory Bird Treaty Act). The United States is a signatory
to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, which
requires signatory nations to develop domestic legislation regulating and constraining trade in
endangered species. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna, art. VIII, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1o87.
249. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-32 (2oo7).
250. See id. at 507-08 (citing National Climate Program Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908;
Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1407)-
251. See id. at 5o4-o9, 521-22 (problems caused by climate change include reduced water supply in
arid states, flooding due to a rise in sea levels, drought affecting agriculture, extreme weather events
including hurricanes and tornadoes, and an increase in the spread of disease).
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Additionally, individual states cannot adequately remedy the causes
of climate change and thus are separately incompetent to regulate the
issue. Indeed, the fact that the injury was so widely shared generated
significant disagreement in the Massachusetts v. EPA Court's standing
inquiry.2 2 Following Massachusetts, the EPA Administrator confirmed
this assessment by denying California's waiver request to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions.' The Administrator argued that California
bore no special or unique impact as "greenhouse gas emissions harm the
environment in California and elsewhere regardless of where the
emissions occur," 254 and then implied in a second waiver denial that the
problem was national and required federal action.' Therefore, federal
regulation can be justified under the third prong of national impact
analysis because the problems caused by greenhouse gas emissions affect
the national as a whole.
Despite the federal government's intransigence in regulating
greenhouse gases, "some thirty-two states are either full members or
official observers in a regional trading association." 256 However, these
efforts will probably be ruled unconstitutional under the dormant
commerce clause.25" Thus, "[t]here is no substitute for a federal climate
law,25" because the states cannot separately address the issue. In this way,
dormant commerce clause doctrine suggests that only a national
response can adequately address this issue.
C. GROUNDWATER
Currently, groundwater is not regulated by the federal government.
However, with groundwater resources subject to increasing extraction
and reservoirs rapidly declining, the federal government may need to
252. Compare id. at 522 (discussing likely injury in Massachusetts), with id. at 541 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that climate change is "harmful to humanity at large" and thus Massachusetts has
no particularized injury (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 5o, 6o (D.C. Cir. 2oo5) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part))).
253. Oversight of EPA's Decision to Deny the California Waiver: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Environment & Public Works, iioth Cong. (2oo8) (statement of Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator,
EPA), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore-id=
dc9b6b66-74d7-431b-be4c-699c8f3oaf9f.
254. Id.
255. See OFFICE OF COUNSEL LEGAL REVIEW, EPA, EPA's CALIFORNIA WAIVER DECISION ON
GREENHOUSE GAs AUTOMOBILE EMIssioNs MET STATUTORY PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS (2008),
available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2oo9/2oo812o9-o9-P-0056.pdf; see also Notice of Decision
Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California's Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 12,16o, 12,168 (Mar. 6, 2008).
256. See Joseph Allan MacDougald, Response, Why Climate Law Must Be Federal: The Clash
Between Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and State Greenhouse Gas Trading Systems, 40 CONN. L.
REV. I431, 1434 (2008).
257. See id. at 1450 (concluding that the impossibility of controlling leakage without contravening
dormant commerce clause principles dooms state cap-and-trade systems).
258. Id.
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protect water supplies. 59 Interestingly, the Supreme Court already
considered the problem of which sovereign should regulate groundwater,
but curtailed the states' authority to regulate. In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex
rel. Douglas, the Court labeled groundwater a "commodity" and ruled
unconstitutional Nebraska's statute limiting withdrawal of groundwater
from Nebraska wells for use in neighboring states as a violation of the
dormant commerce clause.26o The Court stated, "Ground water overdraft
is a national problem and Congress has the power to deal with it on that
scale."261 This dicta suggests that Congress can regulate groundwater
withdrawal. Justice Rehnquist assailed this position, calling the majority's
statement that Congress has the power to regulate groundwater
"gratuitous[].2 6 2 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist argued that states have
263a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting local air, water, and forests.
Nevertheless, despite Justice Rehnquist's complaints, Sporhase's "water-
as-commodity philosophy may hamper [Western] states' ability to limit
the export of their water resources to other states.,264 Combined with the
Court's realization that individual state action cannot resolve the
interstate problems of groundwater depletion, Congress must have the
power to legislate on interstate groundwater aquifers.
Thus, groundwater regulation presents a scenario where category
three of the national impact test would also justify regulation-
particularly where several states overlie the same aquifer, like the
Ogallala Aquifer in Sporhase.265 Because groundwater reserves
frequently exist under multiple states, those states have incentives to
consume as much groundwater as possible, thereby damaging the market
in groundwater in the neighboring state. States cannot prevent this
tragedy of the commons, even by employing carefully tailored legislation
like that of Nebraska in Sporhase, due to the strictures of the dormant
commerce clause.
Even in purely intrastate aquifers, such as California's Central
Valley Aquifer, issues of national impact often arise. The Central Valley
constitutes the world's richest agricultural region, yet faces crippling
water supply issues.266 Because the commons of a groundwater aquifer
259. Many states share groundwater aquifers-a classic "commons." See Garrett L. Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243, 1243-48.
260. 458 U.S. 941, 954-58 (1982).
261. Id. at 954.
262. Id. at 961 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
263. Id.
264. Klein, supra note 19, at II.
265. 458 U.S. at 953 ("The multistate character of the Ogallala aquifer-underlying appellants'
tracts of land in Colorado and Nebraska. as well as parts of Texas. New Mexico. Oklahoma. and
Kansas-confirms the view that there is a significant federal interest in conservation as well as in fair
allocation of this diminishing resource." (footnote omitted)).
266. THOMAS B. REILLY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF TILE INTERIOR, GROUND-WATER AVAILABILITY IN THE
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has not been adequately regulated by California, the federal government
must have the authority to regulate even this purely intrastate natural
resource due to its possible dramatic effect on the nation's economy.
Therefore, under the national impact test, Congress must have power to
regulate some groundwater issues.
V. APPLYING THE NATIONAL IMPACT TEST To ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER
This Part applies the national impact test to issues where the
commerce power would not permit Congress to extend its regulatory
reach. Faithfully applying the test in this manner will help courts
determine "what is truly national and what is truly local""' and not
"obliterate [that] distinction.",,' This principled approach suggests that
"if the national government exercises power over non national [sic]
matters, it goes beyond the purpose for which it was created."'f This
view comports with the national impact test's purpose and design.
A. ISOLATED WETLANDS
In SWANCC, the Court ruled that section 404(b) of the Clean
Water Act did not authorize the Army Corps of Engineers to regulate
isolated wetlands.270 Although the Court did not hold that regulating such
isolated wetlands exceeded Congress's commerce power, the Court did
imply that the Army Corps' interpretation raised "significant
constitutional questions" in part because its interpretation would
constitute "a significant impingement of the States' traditional and
primary power over land and water use."27' One commentator who
considered the issue argued that an isolated wetland is not connected to
other waters and thus does not fall within the national interest.2 72
However, the inability to distinguish which waters the federal
government has authority to regulate has resulted in regulatory paralysis
and defeated the purpose of the Clean Water Act: to protect water
quality, the environment, and public health.2 73
In this context, regulations by an executive agency are inappropriate
because the national impact is less obvious, unlike with greenhouse
gases, for example. As the Court implied in SWANCC, the judiciary
UNITED STATES 44-49 (2oo8), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1323/pdf/CircularI323 book-5o8.pdf.
267. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 529, 567-68 (1995).
268. Id. at 567 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935)).
269. Lacour, supra note 93, at 207.
270. 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
271I. Id.
272. Cramer, supra note 212, at 30609.
273. Charles Duhigg & Janet Roberts, Rulings Restrict Clean Water Act, Foiling E.P.A., N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. I, 2010, at Ax, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2obo/o3/oI/us/olwater.html.
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should be reticent to grant constitutional authority based on an executive
agency's interpretation without Congress having squarely considered the
issue, particularly at the margins of Congress's power.2 74 Accordingly,
legislation would have to be promulgated that makes explicit the national
impact or the states' separate incompetence to justify its
constitutionality.
B. WILDLIFE
Power to regulate wildlife that is not endangered should continue to
reside primarily with the states. This stance accords with states'
traditional authority to regulate wildlife." For example, hunting licenses
are issued on a state-by-state basis. Yet, under the current doctrine,
aggregation of hunting activities may substantially affect interstate
commerce, thereby suggesting the propriety of federal legislation."' This
result is yet another example of the inadequacy of the substantial effects
test.
Application of the national impact test, however, provides a
principled way to allocate authority over wildlife. Generally, power over
wildlife resources resides with the states. However, when a species begins
to decline in number such that the entire species is threatened with
extinction, the states have demonstrated their separate incompetence to
protect those resources.7 Under the ESA, when states prove their
incapacity, federal agencies must step in and regulate that species.7
When a species declines in abundance to the point of near extinction, it is
clear states do not have sufficient incentive to protect that species
because the states have plenary and primary power over wildlife. If they
could protect the species in their primary regulatory capacity, the species
would never have reached such critically low numbers. Therefore, in
these situations, it makes structural sense to have the federal government
be the proper regulating sovereign.
There are other examples of current federal legislation on wildlife
that comport with the national impact test. The Migratory Bird Treaty
Act, implementing the Migratory Bird Treaty, protects an animal that
274. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173-
275. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976) ("[T]he States have broad trustee and police
powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions.").
276. Some hunted species do not cross state boundaries and yet may have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. Citizens travel from all over the world to hunt animals, paying substantial fees to
state and private parties for licenses, guides, weaponry, and other equipment. Others travel to see
unique flora and fauna that may be located in one state and expend significant sums of money as
tourists.
277. If Congress passed legislation enabling federal agencies to be proactive and prevent species
from declining to the point of extinction, this legislation would likely be constitutional under the
national impact test because of the national importance of protecting species diversity.
278. See supra Part IV.A.
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crosses interstate boundaries." These birds are not generally objects of
commerce, but their very mobility renders the states separately
incompetent. Without a national response, no single state could
adequately regulate. Thus, the national interest shows that Congress
should have the power to regulate." Additionally, the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act applies principally to wildlife on federal
property, but provides a cabined mechanism to reach animals living
entirely in one state.28 These federal legislative responses appropriately
respond to problems that are national in scope and that could not be
regulated by the states separately.
In the absence of demonstrated state incapacity or national
impact, regulatory power over wildlife should remain with the states.
This default position recognizes that states can effectively protect their
biological resources and are appropriately responsible for doing so.
C. LAND USE
Analysis of land use laws under the national impact test affirms the
states' claim to primary regulatory authority. As one commentator
argues, "Land use policies are of a state character because state capacity
for addressing these issues is ample, and not subject to contradiction by
the actions of surrounding states."23 Because land use laws and
regulation of property have been a traditional state government
activity, 84 the states have extensive experience managing those issues.
Without documented state inability to regulate or national effects,
Congress cannot establish that they are the proper regulatory authority.
While land use laws generally lie outside the power granted to
Congress by the national impact test, land use laws regulating heavily
polluted or contaminated land, or strip mining of coal, should be within
the commerce power. In United States v. Olin Corp., the Eleventh Circuit
held that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) was within the federal commerce power
279. I6 U.S.C. §H 703-712 (2oo6).
280. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (upholding the MBTA against a challenge that the
statute was not within Congress's commerce power). But see Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of certiorari, and arguing that regulating
occasional rainwater ponds supporting migratory birds was beyond Congress's commerce power).
281. 16 U.S.C. §H 1331-1340; see Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (upholding the
WFRHBA against a challenge that the statute was beyond Congress's Property Clause power).
282. See, e.g., Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187, 187-89 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
o 701, 3371-3378 (2oo6 & Supp. 2oo8)) (bolstering state wildlife laws by forbidding interstate
transportation or sale of animals taken illegally in the state of origin).
283. Kmiec, supra note 107, at 566.
284. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 529, 591 & n.4 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("'States
have sole authority over 'rules of property.'"' (quoting A Native of Virginia: Observations upon the
Proposed Plan of Federal Government, in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 692 (M. Jensen ed., 1978) (1788))).
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under the substantial effects on interstate commerce prong.285 Although
the contamination at issue was purely intrastate and was not the subject
of commercial transaction, the Eleventh Circuit held that Congress acted
within its power for two reasons.286 First, the failure of companies to clean
up hazardous waste might lead others to follow suit-a process of
"opting-out" of clean-ups that would substantially affect interstate
commerce by leaving ruined land in their wake.287 Second, the Court
relied on the market activity surrounding the recovery, transportation,
and disposal of waste.88 But that case was decided in 1997, before
Morrison and Raich and before the SWANCC Court's statement that
land use regulation has long been a traditional state power.289
Nonetheless, because of the easily demonstrated national impact, Olin's
rationale and findings should continue to support CERCLA's
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.
Another example of land use laws legitimate under Congress's
commerce power is the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 (SMCRA), which seeks to redress states' inability to effectively
regulate strip mining.290 SMCRA employs a cooperative federalism
approach under which the federal government can approve a state
program, which authorizes the state to regulate mining operations if the
state demonstrates that it has a law that is at least as strict as SMCRA
and that the state has a regulatory agency with the wherewithal to
administer the program. 29'
Applying the national impact test faithfully requires that Congress
specifically find facts establishing the national impact of heavily polluted
properties and strip mining such that the states are separately
incompetent to address the problem. This is particularly so in a field (like
land use) where states have traditionally held authority. While the states
are separately competent to regulate land use and some hazardous waste
problems, they can control neither the interstate market of hazardous
waste recovery and removal nor the interstate market for polluted
properties. 292 Additionally, the widespread nature of Superfund sites
285. 107 F.3d r5o6, x5ix (sIth Cir. 1997); see also Missouri v. Indep. Petrochemical Corp., No. 83-
2670C(2), 1986 WL 15704, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 1986); United States v. Glidden Co., 3 F. Supp. 2d
823, 842 (N.D. Ohio 1997) ("CERCLA's legislative history does not contain any specific findings
regarding the effect that the improper disposal of hazardous waste has on interstate commerce. It
does, however, contain broad findings that provide a rational basis on which to conclude that the
improper disposal of hazardous waste substantially affects interstate commerce."), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, United 5tates v. i5o Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2000).
286. Olin, 107 F.3d at i5ii.
287. Id at 15 ai & n.I
288. Id. at 1511.
289. See Solid waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 59, 174 (2ooi).
290. 30 U.S.C. §§# 1234-1328 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
291. Id.
292. See Olin, 107 F.3d at 1511.
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suggests that the entire nation is affected by the problem of heavily
polluted properties.2" Therefore, the contaminated properties and strip
mining subsets of land use regulation should survive scrutiny under the
national impact test.294 Thus, as in the ESA context, the federal
government's power stems directly from the states' separate inability to
address the issue at hand-here, providing effective mechanisms to
remediate heavily-polluted properties and regulate strip mining.
CONCLUSION
This Note analyzed and criticized the existing state of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence by rejecting the current formalist focus on whether
a regulated activity can be described as "economic." This Note then
developed a national impact test and applied it to environmental laws to
demonstrate the functioning of this analytical framework. The test can
also be employed in the context of race discrimination, criminal law, and
social welfare legislation, where Congress's regulatory power faces
significant uncertainty
Applying the national impact test accords power calibrated to
competence. This will have the salutary result that the judiciary can
safeguard the liberty of American citizens by preventing the tyranny of
an excessively powerful central government. Citizens (even ten-year-
olds) will know which government has the power to address the issue at
hand, and which bums to vote out of office.
The courts should faithfully apply the principle motivating the
Framers in 1787: that where an issue affects the nation as a whole or the
states are separately incompetent to redress the problem, Congress must
have authority to act. Doing so will enable our nation to address and
resolve the increasingly contentious and complex environmental
problems of the twenty-first century.
293. A brief survey of the EPA's National Priority List (NPL) revealed sites in all fifty states. See
EPA, Superfund Sites Where You Live, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/index.htm (last visited
Mar. 17, 201o). As of 2004, 1284 sites were listed on the NPL, but assessments had been conducted by
the EPA on more than 41,000 sites. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 204, at 218.
294. Similar analytical questions would apply to existing federal laws regulating land use activities,
including historic structures and preservation, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, i6
U.S.C. §§ 470-47ox-6; Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, i6 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-47o1mm.
filling of wetlands under section 404 of the Clean water Act, and species mitigation projects pursuant
to Habitat Conservation Plans under the ESA.
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